Abstract-The smart grid combines the classical power system with information technology leading to a cyber-physical system. In such an environment the malicious injection of data has the potential to cause severe consequences. Classical residualbased methods for bad data detection are unable to detect well designed false data injection (FDI) attacks. Moreover, most work on FDI attack detection is based on the linearized DC model of the power system and fails to detect attacks based on the AC model. The aim of this paper is to address these problems by using the graph structure of the grid and the AC power flow model. We derive an attack detection method that has the ability to detect previously undetectable FDI attacks. This method is based on concepts originating from graph signal processing (GSP). The proposed detection scheme consists of calculating the graph Fourier transform of an estimated grid state and filtering the graph high-frequency components. By comparing the maximum norm of this outcome with a threshold we can detect the presence of FDI attacks. Case studies on the IEEE 14-bus system demonstrate that the proposed method is able to detect a wide range of previously undetectable attacks.
(PSSE). The PSSE provides the input for multiple monitoring purposes, including security assessment, load forecasting, reliability analysis, and economic considerations [12] , [13] . Thus, the impact of FDI attacks could be manifold and range from economic consequences, through overloading and physical damage to serious human hazard [14] [15] [16] . The PSSE is usually equipped with methods to detect random false data and faults that are based on residuals (see, e.g. [17] , [18] and Ch. 5 in [12] ). However, it was shown in [19] that if the attacker has sufficient knowledge of the system topology, a well-designed attack can pass the residual-based bad data detector and perturb the PSSE to any desired level. This knowledge about the system topology can be gained by analyzing measurements [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] . Such types of attacks are called undetectable attacks [19] or stealth attacks [25] , [26] . Further detection methods, such as in [27] , [28] have been suggested, but these, too, cannot overcome the model based limitation of detecting such attacks. Seeking to derive ways of rendering the smart grid robust to FDI attacks, the authors of [14] review major types of defense strategies, such as data authentication [15] , and the inclusion of time synchronized phasor measurement units (PMUs) [29] . These require the placement of additional hardware equipment into the grid infrastructure. Algorithmic approaches try to detect the presence of bad data or FDI attacks by analyzing the measurements and estimated grid state. In [30] the authors propose a method to detect previously unobservable attacks, but their approach is limited to sparse attacks. In [29] the residual evaluation is done between two consecutive time steps, thus facilitating the detection of unobsorvable attacks. However, this approach is easily corrupted once the attacker has injected false data on one occasion. Other detection methods for undetectable FDI attacks require reliable load forecasts [31] or explore machine learning concepts [32] . But machine learning approaches can lead to unexpected behavior with models that are not fully understood. Finally, in [33] and [34] , signals originating from hardware components and from the process level, respectively, are used to detect unobservable FDI attacks, but these solutions are very specific to the hardware and protocols used in the power system. Most of the aforementioned works ( [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] , [35] ) rely on the linearized DC model to describe the electrical behavior of the power system. This is a significant shortcoming with regard to the vulnerability analysis [11] . Since the construction of an undetectable attack based on the AC model requires that the attacker has far more knowledge and can solve nonconvex optimization problems [11] , [27] , detection methods for AC model based FDI attacks have not been extensively studied yet, e.g. [36] . Nevertheless, several contributions exist that show how an attacker could construct undetectable attacks based on the AC model [11] , [27] , [37] , [38] . In recent years, the research field of graph signal processing (GSP) has emerged. The key idea of GSP is to extend the concepts of digital signal processing (DSP) to data connected on graphs [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] . This enables the definition of classic signal processing concepts, such as filtering, sampling, and modulation, for signals related to an underlying graph structure [39] . Previously, GSP has been applied to various fields, such as sensor networks, biological networks, image processing, machine learning, and data science [43] , [44] . However, GSP has rarely been applied in the context of power systems (see, e.g. [45] , where it is used to disaggregate the total load of one power measurement). In this paper, we consider the detection of FDI attacks in power systems based on the output of the PSSE. We use the concept of the graph Fourier transform (GFT), originating from GSP and inspired by the work presented in [40] that detects anomalies in a network of temperature sensors. By relying on the electrical properties of the power system, which can be interpreted as an undirected graph, we design a new detection method that is not limited by fundamental unobservabilities that originate from the simple linear equations of the system and, thus, can detect unobservable attacks. The contribution of this paper is threefold: First, we propose a statistical model of the output of general PSSE, which can be based on any type of measurement, including measurements form smart meters or PMUs. Second, this approach relies on the AC power system model and, thus, facilitates the detection of attacks on both voltage angle and magnitude. Third, we derive a new method to detect previously undetectable FDI attacks in power systems. The proposed method is based on filtering the graph Fourier transformed estimated grid state. This filter is designed as a high pass filter in the sense of graph frequencies. Then, by comparing the maximum norm of the filtered signal with a threshold, the presence of FDI attacks is discovered. In addition, the influence of the graph smoothness on the detection of FDI attacks is investigated. Finally, we conduct numerical simulations on the IEEE 14-bus test case that demonstrate that the proposed method is able to detect previously undetectable attacks. A preliminary version of this approach, which is limited to the DC model, and without the derivations of the cutoff frequency of the filter and the detection threshold has been published in [46] . The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II we introduce the mathematical modeling of the power system and the FDI attacks. The use of GSP concepts for FDI attack detection is presented in Section III. Several case studies in Section IV show the successful implementation of the proposed method. In Section V the results of the case studies are examined in detail and an outline is given about the use of the proposed method for the DC power flow model. The paper ends with conclusions in Section VI.
II. POWER SYSTEM AND ATTACK MODELING
In this section, we first model the power system as an undirected graph in Subsection II-A. In Subsection II-B we present the AC power flow model used in this paper. The considered FDI attack detection in the form of a hypothesis testing problem is presented in Subsection II-C.
A. Graph Representation of Power System
The power system can be represented by an undirected graph, G = (X, E), where X = {1, . . . , M } is a set of M nodes that represent the buses with connected loads or generators, and E = {(e k,l )} is a set of edges connecting the buses, in which e k,l represents the transmission line between bus k and bus l, for any k, l ∈ X such that there is a transmission line between those buses. Such finite graph structures are described by a weighted Laplacian matrix, Y, with the following (k, l)-th element
where E k = {e k,m ∈ E, m = 1, . . . , M } and y k,l is the weight assigned to the connection between node k and node l. In the power system context, this weight represents the electrical admittance, y k,l , of the particular transmission line, and Y is also called the admittance matrix. Thus, the matrix Y depends on the topology of the grid, as well as on the admittance values of the lines. With regard to the modeling of the electrical behavior of the power system via the power flow equations, one can distinguish between the approximated linearized DC power flow model and the more accurate nonlinear AC model [47] . In the following, the AC model is considered. A summary on how to use the proposed method on the DC model is given in Subsection V-C.
B. AC Model
The goal of the AC power flow analysis is the computation of the complex voltages at each bus in steady-state conditions [47] . The AC power flow equations can be written in matrix form as follows:
T ∈ C M is the vector of bus voltages, and Y ∈ C M ×M is the admittance matrix, as defined in (1) . Generally, the complex voltage at the m-th bus in polar form is given by v m = V m e jϕm ∀ m = 1, . . . , M , where V m is the voltage magnitude in per unit (p.u.) and ϕ m is the voltage angle or phase. Neglecting the phase shift and off nominal turns ratio (tap) of transformers, as well as the capacitive shunt reactances of lines, the admittance, y k,l , of each line in the electric grid is described by
where r k,l and x k,l denote the electrical resistance and reactance, respectively. By substituting (3) in (1) we obtain the admittance matrix for the AC model, Y, which can be interpreted as a complex Laplacian matrix. This matrix can be decomposed as follows:
where Y R ∈ R M ×M is the real part and Y J ∈ R M ×M is the imaginary part of Y. With (4), (2) can be written:
where v R and v J are the real and imaginary parts of v, respectively, such that v = v R + jv J . The matrices Y R and −Y J are both real Laplacian matrices. As the FDI attack detection approach described in Section III requires real Laplacian matrices as inputs, each of the terms in (5) will be investigated independently.
C. Hypothesis Testing
In the following, it is assumed that an attacker launches an undetectable FDI attack. This is done by tampering with some of the measurements of the power system. We assume that this attack can be on any type of measurement that is used as an input to the PSSE, such as line power and current flows, power injection at the buses, bus voltage magnitudes, bus voltage angles originating from PMUs, and power consumption originating from smart meters. Thus, an advantage of the considered model is that it is not limited to specific measurements and can be used for both smart and traditional systems. The PSSE uses the measurements and calculates the system state, v, i.e. the voltage angle and magnitude for every bus in the power system. As the attack is assumed to be undetectable for classic approaches, it bypasses the PSSE and the residual based bad data detection. Therefore, in this work we consider that the output of the PSSE is given by
where v is the true unknown value of the bus voltage vector, e is the error of the PSSE, which is assumed to be a zeromean Gaussian noise vector with known variance, σ 2 e , and c ∈ C M is an arbitrary vector defining the impact of the attack. If c = 0, there is no attack. It should be emphasized that while FDI attacks are usually considered to be sparse attacks [27] , [30] , [48] , in the sense that attacks are launched only at a few buses, here, the attack vector c is not necessarily sparse, since it represents the influence of the attack on the PSSE. The PSSE output in (6) is very general and can be obtained by any existing PSSE method. That is, in this paper we take the PSSE for granted and use its result to detect the attacks. Figure 1 illustrates the standard PSSE and bad data detection routine with an additional FDI attack detection method. The task of detecting an FDI attack based on the PSSE output is equivalent to making the decision if c = 0 in (6). In hypothesis testing formulation, we consider the following problem:
H 0 : c = 0
where know the true value of v in (6), we cannot distinguish between v and v + c and, thus, this type of attack cannot be detected by likelihood ratio tests. In this paper, we rely on the inherent graph structure of the electrical properties of the grid to gain additional insights into the situation and to overcome this limitation.
III. FDI ATTACK DETECTION In this section we develop a novel method for the detection of unobservable FDI attacks. For the sake of simplicity of presentation, all the following deviations are presented for the first term in (5), taking the real part of the Laplacian matrix, Y R , and the real part of the voltage vector, v R . For the other three terms the approach is analogous, and comprises the following steps: After verifying the small total variation of the graph (see Subsection III-A) and the eigendecomposition, the first step is to calculate the GFT, as described in Subsection III-B. The second step is to design the graph high pass filter (GHPF), as described in Subsection III-C. The third step is the thresholding and detection, as described in Subsection III-D.
A. Smooth Graphs
The smoothness of a signal defined on graph vertices can be measured by the total variation [39] , [49] :
This measures the difference between the states at each bus, k, and at its neighbor, l, on the graph, normalized by the particular entry of the admittance matrix Y k,l . The smaller the total variation is, the smoother is the signal defined on the graph. A sufficient smoothness of the undisturbed signal is a necessary condition for the detection after high pass filtering. The total variation can also be an indicator of the presence of bad data or FDI attacks, as such disturbances tend to increase the total variation, defined in (8). In Subsection IV-A we calculate the total variation for several IEEE test grids.
B. Graph Fourier Transform (GFT)
The eigendecompositon of the real, symmetric positivesemidefinite matrix Y R defined in Subsection II-B, results in a set of ordered real eigenvalues λ 1 , . . . , λ M that satisfy
and a set of orthonormal eigenvectors U = [u 1 , . . . , u M ] that satisfy the following matrix decomposition:
where Λ R is a diagonal matrix with the eigenvalues from (9). In the context of GSP, the operation of (10) is referred to as spectral decomposition of the matrix Y R , the eigenvectors are called the spectral components and the eigenvalues can be interpreted as the graph frequencies [43] . The ordering of the real eigenvalues in (9) represents the ordering of the graph frequencies, ranging from low to high-frequencies. Based on the decomposition in (10), the GFT of the signal v R is defined as
and the resulting signal F R { v R } has properties analogous to the Fourier transform of classic signals [43] , [49] . In particular, for signals with a small total variation, i.e. high smoothness, the graph Fourier coefficients, i.e. the elements of the GFT vector defined in (11), decay with increasing graph frequency, having the largest contributions in the low frequency components [39] . The major assumption that enables the detection of FDI attacks based on the proposed approach is that with these modifications the Fourier coefficients no longer decay, but they cause peaks in the high-frequency domain of the Fourier coefficients.
C. Filter Design: Graph High Pass Filter (GHPF)
Analogous to classical DSP theory, a graph filter is a system that takes a graph signal as an input, processes it, and produces another graph signal as an output. In the following, we consider polynomial graph filters that take the form [50] :
where h is the transfer function of the filter and L is the degree of the filter. By substituting the decomposition from (10) in (12) we obtain:
where
The output of the filter in (13) is the signal:
Therefore, according to (11) , by multiplying (15) on the left by U R T the GFT of the output in (15) satisfies
Now, by substituting (11) and (13) in (16) and using the fact that for eigenvector matrices U T U = I, one obtains
The frequency response of a GHPF with the cutoff frequency λ cut is defined as follows:
The choice of λ cut is defined by (24) and further explained in Subsection III-D.
The construction of a filter with frequency response of (18) in the form of (14) , which is polynomial of degree L, corresponds to solving a system of the following M linear equations:
where 1 A is the indicator function of the event A. By solving these linear equations the L + 1 unknown coefficients of the filter, h, can be obtained. In this work the filter is designed with L + 1 = M . This choice results in a single exact solution. The idea of this GHPF is to extract the highfrequency components of F R { v R } that contain information about the presence of FDI attacks.
D. Detection Method
To detect the presence of FDI attacks, we use the GHPF described in Subsection III-C to extract the high-frequency components of the graph signal, and then threshold it. If one or more of the Fourier transform coefficients defined in (17) exceeds the threshold value, we conclude that there is an attack. That is, the maximum absolute element of
is compared to a threshold, τ . In [40] the authors define τ max as the maximum from a set of historic states
where N is the number of historic states. Transferred to the application in power systems, the detection threshold τ max is thus the maximum of all Ψ R R that can be calculated based on a list of historic grid states v R 1 , . . . , v R N . In [51] the authors propose a definition of τ that is more statistically robust against outliers. Their idea is translated to the following threshold definition:
where σ R Ψ is the standard deviation between the Ψ R R k . The parameter α σ is a tuning parameter that allows the choice of the confidence interval. Our simulations showed that, indeed, the threshold value in (22) led to better results than those in (21) in the considered settings. Therefore, in the case studies in Section IV, the definition of τ R R in (22) is applied. In order to use the total variation S v R as an indicator for the presence of bad data, the detection threshold is constructed in a way that is analogous to (22) :
using the mean value of all total variations derived from the historic grid states and the associated standard deviation σ R S scaled by the parameter α σ,S that again defines the confidence interval.
The precision of our FDI attack detection method also strongly depends on the choice of the cutoff frequency, λ cut . If the frequency band extends too far into the low-frequency part 
calculate maximum norm Ψ = ||F{s}|| ∞ 8) based on historic states, calculate detection threshold τ = µ Ψ + σ Ψ α σ , where Ψ k = ||h (Λ) F{s k }|| ∞ and µ Ψ is the mean and σ Ψ the standard deviation of all Ψ k 9) return Ψ, τ of the spectrum, normal grid states can also contribute with a high amplitude. However, if the frequency band is too small, attacks might pass undetected. In this work, the cutoff frequency is chosen in a way such that for undisturbed states the contribution that is given by Fourier components above this frequency is very small. To find the threshold, we rely on concepts of graph spectral compression [52] . There, the approximation error R γ that results from cutting off all highfrequency components above the γ-th frequency is defined as [52] 
Normally, this equation is used to compress and approximate the signal. We use it in a different way to find λ cut so that the GHPF for the undisturbed case only contains the frequency components that sum up the approximation error. Algorithm 1 summarizes the proposed approach of applying a GHPF on an arbitrary signal to obtain the maximum norm of its high-frequency components. The overall proposed detection procedure is summarized in Algorithm 2. This algorithm consists of applying Algorithm 1 on all four terms of (5).
IV. CASE STUDY
In this section, the applicability of the proposed approach is investigated on the IEEE 14-bus test grid. This test grid is often used in the context of FDI attack detection [27] , [29] , [31] , [35] , [38] . The voltage angles and magnitudes of this grid are calculated by the AC power flow implemented by the pandapower-tool [53] . Bus number 1 is set to be the slack bus. In the following, three different test cases are conducted. In Subsection IV-A the total variation of undisturbed grid states is investigated. Subsection IV-B investigates sparse attacks on the voltage and magnitude separately while in Subsection IV-C a constructed undetectable FDI attack that combines attacks on the angle and magnitude is launched.
A. Test Case 1: Total Variation of Undisturbed Grid States
In this test case, the total variation of the standard load situation is calculated according to (8) , normalized by the number of buses in the grid, M , and shown in Table I for IEEE 14-bus, 24-bus, 30-bus, and 118-bus test grids [53] . It can be seen that the real part of the graph signal has a smaller total variation, and thus is smoother than the imaginary part. For the IEEE 14-bus test grid, the smoothness of the real and imaginary parts, S v R and S v J , are visualized by plotting the frequency response calculated according to (11) of the two signals F R { v R } and F J { v J }, as shown in Fig. 2  and Fig. 3 . These figures validate the decaying characteristic of the Fourier components and show that
Only the contributions lying above the cutoff frequency λ cut passe the high-pass filter and are used for the detection. In Subsection III-B it is claimed that FDI attacks destroy this decaying behavior. This is visualized, for example, in Fig. 3 with F J { v J } FDI for an angle attack of 10 • on bus number 9. In this figure, and throughout, the graph frequencies are normalized: λ i = λi |λmax| , i = 1, . . . , M .
B. Test Case 2: Voltage Angle and Magnitude Attack
In this test case, the effects of undetectable sparse attacks are systematically investigated for attacks on the voltage magnitude and angle separately on all buses of the grid (except the slack bus) k = 2, . . . , M . The construction of such an attack on the angle is described in [27] , and, similarly, the description given in [37] is used to construct an attack on the voltage magnitude. In particular, the attack is realized by modifying either the magnitude V k or the angle ϕ k according to (6) by adding a certain offset v k,FDI = v k + c with c = A k e ja k , where the attack on the angle is a k and the attack on the magnitude is A k . Concretely, a k ∈ [−12, . . . , 12] degrees and A k ∈ [−0.2, . . . , 0.2] p.u.. Every attack is executed by 100 Monte Carlo simulations of randomly generated grid states following
where y P , y Q are Gaussian random variables with mean 1 and variance σ 2 . The terms P and J γ = 0.001 based on (24) . As the graph is smoother for the real than for the imaginary part, the error is chosen to be smaller for the real part than for the imaginary part. To generate the required historic data, the loads of the grid are again randomly scaled following (25) . Then, an AC power flow is performed that provides the grid states,
The results of these tests are summarized in Figs. 4 and 5 for attacks on the angle and on the magnitude, respectively. In relation to all buses, these figures show for different α σ the probability that an FDI attack with an impact exceeding a particular angle a k or magnitude A k is detected. The red diamonds in Figs. 4 and 5 show the detection based on the smoothness threshold, while the others show the detection based on GFT. As can be seen in these figures, the choice of α σ from (22) directly influences the false alarm rate. According to (22) α σ scales the confidence interval around the mean value. Thus, the false alarm rate is in the order of magnitude of the percentage that lies outside of this confidence interval. In addition, both the analysis related to the real part of the state vector, Ψ R R and Ψ R , contribute to the detection (see Table II for a summary on the detection based on α σ = 2). Attacks on the angle are mostly detected by the imaginary part of the voltage vector, while attacks on the voltage magnitude are, largely, detected by the real part of the voltage vector. This behavior is explained in Subsection V-B. The aggregated presentation in the form of detection probabilities masks the behavior of single buses. However, the detection is exceeded and, thus, the undetectable FDI attack is detected. In this test case, trying to detect the FDI attack with the smoothness parameter is not successful, as the smoothness of both the initial and the attacked state is larger than the threshold defined in (23).
V. REMARKS
In this section, we discuss some aspects and characteristics regarding the proposed approach that appeared in the case studies. We also summarize the application of the FDI attack detection method on the DC model.
A. Detection Characteristics
The case studies in the previous section demonstrate that we are able to detect previously undetectable attacks. It can be verified that attacks on some of the buses are better detected than on others, even if they have the same impact. This behavior can be explained by looking at the diagonal elements of Y. As given in (1), the diagonal elements in the Laplacian matrix, Y k,k , sum up the weights of all edges connected to node k. The smaller this value is, the more "loosely" coupled is the bus. For such buses even large differences between v k and v l do not contribute significantly to the total variation as it is defined in (8) . In summary, for buses with small diagonal values in Y compared to the other buses, attacks are the most difficult to detect. For the detection based on the smoothness, the boundary condition for detectability is immediately given by (8) . As long as the attack does not increase S = v T Y v it cannot be detected. 
B. Contribution of Real and Imaginary Parts
Applying the small angle approximation in (26), i.e. sin ϕ ≈ ϕ and cos ϕ ≈ 1, leads to the following relation:
Thus, FDI attacks on the magnitude mainly influence the real part, while FDI attacks on the angle mainly affect the imaginary part of the voltage.
C. FDI Attack Detection for the DC Model
The DC power flow model is based on the following assumptions [47] :
• voltage magnitude is fixed at 1 p.u.,
• each line e k,l ∈ E is characterized by its reactance, neglecting its resistance,
• the angle difference between two connected buses is quite small. Under these assumptions, the vector of bus voltage angles, ϕ = [ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ M ]
T ∈ R M , is linked to the vector of real power injection or consumption of the buses, p = [P 1 , . . . , P M ]
T ∈ R M , according to
where Y DC ∈ R M ×M is the admittance matrix for the DC model. In this case, the matrix Y DC is a real, symmetric, positive-semidefinite matrix, which takes the form of a weighted Laplacian matrix, as defined in (1), with the elements defined in (28) . The proposed approach for FDI attack detection can be applied to the DC model. The details and a full algorithm for the DC model case can be found in our preliminary work [46] .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we present a novel method for the detection of FDI attacks in power systems, which relies on the inherent graph structure of the grid. The proposed method uses the AC model as a basis to describe the electrical behavior of the grid and its associated graph representation in the form of a Laplacian matrix. The method is based on performing a GFT and filtering the high-frequency components associated with the large eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix. Large contributions in the high-frequency domain indicate the existence of anomalies or malicious FDI attacks. Extensive case studies show that the graph signals originating from power systems exhibit the required decaying behavior in their Fourier components. This concentration within the low-frequency components is destroyed for grid states originating from FDI attacks. This allows the detection of previously undetectable attacks based on the high-frequency content.
